Administrative Regulations - Medicare - Medicare Provider Reimbursement Manual - Defeasance Losses by Vittone, Eugene A., II
Duquesne Law Review 
Volume 34 Number 2 Article 11 
1996 
Administrative Regulations - Medicare - Medicare Provider 
Reimbursement Manual - Defeasance Losses 
Eugene A. Vittone II 
Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Eugene A. Vittone II, Administrative Regulations - Medicare - Medicare Provider Reimbursement Manual - 
Defeasance Losses, 34 Duq. L. Rev. 435 (1996). 
Available at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr/vol34/iss2/11 
This Recent Decision is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Duquesne Law Review by an authorized editor of Duquesne Scholarship Collection. 
ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATIONS-MEDICARE-MEDICARE
PROVIDER REIMBURSEMENT MANUAL-DEFEASANCE LOSSES--The
United States Supreme Court held that the Secretary of Health
and Human Services is not bound to apply generally accepted
accounting principles in calculating the amount which health
care providers should receive under Medicare for reimbursement
of bond defeasance losses.
Shalala v. Guernsey Memorial Hospital, 115 S. Ct. 1232 (1995).
Guernsey Memorial Hospital ("Guernsey") refinanced bonded
debt' which was originally issued in 1972 and 1982, to reduce
its debt service burden.2  Guernsey estimated that the
refinancing of the bonded debt would save it twelve million
dollars over the original term of the debt.3 The refinancing of
the debt would cause an immediate defeasance loss of
$672,581." Guernsey believed that the Medicare program should
be charged with an appropriate share of the loss.' Guernsey
1. Shalala v. Guernsey Memorial Hosp., 115 S. Ct. 1232, 1234 (1995). Bonded
debt is a financing device in which an institution, such as a hospital, sells bonds to
finance capital improvements. Guernsey, 115 S. Ct. at 1234.
2. Id. In refinancing the bonds, Guernsey tried to reduce the interest associ-
ated with the original bonds. Id. Many hospitals conducted this type of refinancing
of bonded debt in order to "lock into" the low interest rates that were available in
the early 1980's and 1990's. Dennis Barry, Shalala v. Guernsey Memorial Hospital,
REIMBURSEMENT ADVISOR, April 1995, at 4.
3. Guernsey, 115 S. Ct. at 1234. See Brief for Petitioner at 22, Guernsey (No.
93-1251) (outlining the specific accounting of transactions involved in the case).
4. Guernsey, 115 S. Ct. at 1234. A defeasance loss is the paper loss that
occurs with the refunding of bonds. SIDNEY DAVIDSON ET AL., FINANCIAL ACCOUNT-
ING; AN INTRODUCTION TO CONCEPTS, METHODS, AND USES 441 (5th ed. 1988). A
defeasance loss is usually offset by the increased revenue produced by refunding. Id.
Defeasance losses occur, through the refunding of bonds, typically an advanced re-
funding type of transaction. Robert L. Roth, USSC Rules 5-4 that DHHS Secretary is
Not Required to Follow GAAP in making Medicare Reimbursement Determinations,
HEALTH LAW DIGEST, April 1995, at 53. In an advanced refunding transaction, a
hospital borrows money in order to pay off bonded debt before the debt matures,
and issues new bonds. Id. The proceeds from the new debt are deposited into an
irrevocable trusteed escrow account for the sole purpose of releasing the provider
from any liability relating to the old debt. Id.
5. Guernsey, 115 S. Ct. at 1234. The Medicare program is the federal pro-
gram that provides reimbursement of health care expenses of senior citizens and the
disabled. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (1988). The Medicare program allows hospitals and
participating providers to charge to the program an amount which is based on the
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further believed that the portion chargeable to the Medicare
program should be assessed within one year.6 Guernsey's
position was consistent with generally accepted accounting
principles ("GAAP"),7 an accrual accounting method.8 The
Secretary of Health and Human Services (the "Secretary"), who
administers the Medicare program,9 stated that the portion
attributable to Medicare of the defeasance loss should be
amortized over the normal term of the bonds.10 Guernsey
use of the health care facilities by program beneficiaries. Id. See infra note 35 for
the relevant text of 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (1988).
6. Guernsey, 115 S. Ct. at 1234. Under the Medicare program reimbursement
scheme, participating hospitals furnish services to program beneficiaries and are
reimbursed by the Secretary of Health and Human Services through fiscal intermedi-
aries. Id. at 1235. Fiscal intermediaries are groups which contract with the Health
Care Financing Agency (the "HCFA") to administer the Medicare program locally. Id.
This administration also includes making initial reimbursement decisions. Id. See 42
U.S.C. §§ 1395g, 1395h (1995). Hospitals are reimbursed for "reasonable costs,"
which are defined by the statute as "the cost actually incurred, excluding therefrom
any part of incurred cost found to be unnecessary in the efficient delivery of needed
health services." Guernsey, 115 S. Ct. at 1235.
7. Guernsey, 115 S. Ct. at 1235. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles are
the conventions, rules, and procedures necessary to define accepted accounting prac-
tice at a particular time; which includes both broad guidelines and relatively de-
tailed practices and procedures. DAVIDSON ET AL., supra note 4, at 747. GAAP con-
sists of three official publications of the American Institute of Certified Public Ac-
countants. Id. These publications are the Accounting Principles Board Opinions, the
Financial Accounting Standards Board Statements, and the Accounting Research
Bulletins. Id. See Mother Francis Hosp. v. Shalala, 15 F.3d 423, 424 (5th Cir. 1994).
8. Guernsey, 115 S. Ct. at 1237. The accrual accounting method is the meth-
od of accounting that recognizes revenue as goods are sold (or delivered) and as
services are rendered, independent of the time when cash is received. DAVIDSON ET
AL., supra note 4, at 711. Expenses are recognized in the period when the related
revenue is recognized, independent of the time that expenses were met. Id. This
method of accounting can be contrasted with the cash basis of accounting where
revenue is recognized when cash is received and expenses are recognized when the
disbursements are made. Id. at 721.
9. Guernsey, 115 S. Ct. at 1235. The Secretary's authority is derived from 42
U.S.C. § 1395b-1, b-2 (1995).
10. Id. at 1234. The Medicare Statute authorizes the Secretary to promulgate
regulations "establishing the method or methods to be used" for determining reason-
able costs, directing the Secretary in the process to "consider among other things,
the principles generally applied by national organizations or established pre-payment
organizations (which have developed such principles) in computing reimbursement
amounts." Id. at 1235. See infra note 35 for the text of 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(v)(1)(A)
(1988). The Secretary's position was consistent with an informal Medicare reimburse-
ment guideline contained in the Medicare Provider Reimbursement Manual (the
"Manual"). Id. at 1234. See MEDICARE PROVIDER REIMBURSEMENT MANUAL § 233
(March 1993). The Manual contains a detailed set of policies and guidelines to assist
in Medicare reimbursement decisions. Id. The Manual provides guidelines and poli-
cies to implement Medicare regulations which set forth principles for determining
the reasonable cost of provider services furnished under the Health Insurance for the
Aged Act of 1965. Id. The provisions of the law and the regulations are accurately
reflected in the Manual, but do not have the effect of regulations. See Graham Hosp.
Ass'n v. Sullivan, 832 F. Supp. 1235, 1238 (D.C. Tl. 1993). Section 233 of the Manu-
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sought reimbursement for the defeasance loss within one year
from its fiscal intermediary, Blue Cross and Blue
Shield/Community Mutual Insurance Company (the
"Intermediary")." Reimbursement was denied based upon the
Intermediary's interpretation of section 233 of the Medicare
Provider's Reimbursement Manual (the "Manual")." Section
233 states that a defeasance loss must be amortized13 over the
term of new bonds. 4 Guernsey appealed the decision to the
Provider Reimbursement Review Board (the "PRRB"),5 which
overruled the Intermediary. 6 The Secretary overruled the
PRRB and concluded that the defeasance loss must be amortized
consistent with the informal administrative guideline of section
233 issued in the Manual. 7 Guernsey brought an action in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio
and challenged the reimbursement calculation of its defeasance
loss. 8
The district court held for the Secretary." The district court
held that the Secretary was not required to treat a provider's
refinancing expense in accordance with GAAP and could instead
follow the Manual. 2' The district court also found that the
Secretary did not act arbitrarily by refusing to recognize
Guernsey's interest account as a funded depreciation amount."
al requires that the gain or loss on a refunding transaction is to be spread over a
number of years. MEDICARE PROVIDER REIMBURSEMENT MANUAL § 233 (March 1993).
Section 233 is an interpretation of 42 C.F.R. § 413.9. Id.
11. Guernsey, 115 S. Ct. at 1234. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395h (1995) for the statu-
tory authority of the Secretary to contract with organizations for the purposes of
becoming a Medicare intermediary.
12. Guernsey, 115 S. Ct. at 1234.
13. Id. Amortization is the allocation of the cost or other basis of an intangi-
ble asset over its estimated useful life. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 83 (6th ed. 1990).
14. Guernsey, 115 S. Ct. at 1234. See Guernsey Memorial Hosp. v. Sullivan,
796 F. Supp. 283, 284 (S.D. Ohio 1992), modified sub nom. Guernsey Memorial
Hosp. v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 996 F.2d 830 (6th Cir. 1993), rev'd
sub nom. Shalala v. Guernsey Memorial Hosp., 115 S. Ct. 1232 (1995). See also 42
U.S.C. § 1395oo (1995) for details of the full administrative review process for Medi-
care providers.
15. Guernsey, 115 S. Ct. at 1234. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(h) (1995) (establish-
ing Provider Reimbursement Review Boards).
16. Guernsey, 115 S. Ct. at 1234.
17. Id.
18. Id. The district court had jurisdiction of the case under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395oo(f)(1) (1995). 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(f)(1) states in pertinent part: "[Tihe Court's
review is not de novo but is limited to determining whether the Secretary's action
was unsupported by substantial evidence, or was arbitrary or capricious, an abuse of
discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law." 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(f)(1) (1995).
19. Guernsey, 796 F. Supp. at 293.
20. Id. at 291-92.
21. Id. at 284. This issue was not raised on appeal to the United States Su-
438 Duquesne Law Review Vol. 34:435
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed in
part.2 The court of appeals upheld the district court on the
issue of Guernsey's interest account. On the issue of whether
the defeasance loss should be amortized, the court of appeals
held that the Secretary's interpretation of the Manual was void
for lack of notice and failure to follow the comment provision of
the Administrative Procedures Act (the "APA").2' The court of
appeals also held that the Secretary was bound to follow GAAP
because of the prior reliance of the Secretary on GAAP in other
portions of the Manual.25
Certiorari was granted by the United States Supreme Court,
which identified two issues for review.2" The first issue was
whether general Medicare record-keeping and reporting
regulations require that provider costs be reimbursed according
to GAAP despite contrary administrative rules issued by the
Secretary to govern reimbursement of particular types of
costs.27 The second issue was whether the provision of the
Manual on which the Secretary relied in denying reimbursement
was invalid as a legislative rule issued without compliance with
the notice and comment provisions of the APA.2s
The majority began its analysis of the case with an
interpretation of 42 C.F.R. § 413.2029 and narrowly interpreted
the section as a requirement for the maintenance of the records
preme Court, Guernsey, 115 S. Ct. at 1232.
22. Guernsey Memorial Hosp. v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 996
F.2d 830 (6th Cir. 1993), rev'd sub noma. Shalala v. Guernsey Memorial Hosp., 115
S. Ct. 1232 (1995).
23. Guernsey, 996 F.2d at 836.
24. Id. at 832. See 5 U.S.C. § 551 (1994). The APA provides for definite proce-
dures that administrative agencies must follow when adopting regulations to imple-
ment statutes passed by Congress. Id. One of these procedures is the notice and
comment provision, which allows interested parties to comment on proposed rule-
making before it becomes an administrative rule. Id. § 553(c). The court of appeals
concluded that the section in the Manual was a substantial change in the regula-
tions and was void by the failure of the agency to comply with the APA in adopting
the interpretive guideline. Guernsey, 996 F.2d at 832.
25. Guernsey, 996 F.2d at 833.
26. Guernsey, 115 S. Ct. at 1234.
27. Id. Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court in which Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1235. 42 C.F.R. § 413.20 provides in pertinent part:
The principles of cost reimbursement require that providers maintain sufficient
financial records and statistical data for proper determination of costs payable
under the program. Standardized definitions, accounting, statistics, and report-
ing practices that are widely accepted in the hospital and related fields are
followed. Changes in these practices and systems will not be required in order
to determine costs payable under the principles of reimbursement.
42 C.F.R. § 413.20 (1993).
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to be used in determining the amount of Medicare
reimbursement." The majority concluded that the regulation
did not require the Secretary to use. GAAP in determining the
amount of reimbursement, as was urged by Guernsey.31 The
Court stated that the Secretary's position, that § 413.20(a) did
not require reimbursement according to GAAP, was supported
by the regulation's text and the overall structure of the
regulations. 2 The Court noted that this was a reasonable
regulatory interpretation to which the Court must defer.3
In reaching this conclusion, the majority relied upon previous
Supreme Court decisions which had given substantial deference
to agency interpretations of an agency's own regulations.'
Justice Kennedy found support for the Secretary's reading of the
regulations in the Medicare Statute." Justice Kennedy also




34. Id. See generally Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 114 S. Ct. 2381, 2386
(1994) (holding that the Secretary's interpretation of the reimbursement regulation
was neither clearly erroneous nor inconsistent with the language of the regulation);
Martin v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 499 U.S. 144, 151 (1991)
(holding that a reviewing court should defer to the Secretary of Labor rather than
the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission when each furnish reason-
able, but inconsistent interpretations of an ambiguous regulation promulgated by the
Secretary of Labor); Lyng v. Payne, 476 U.S. 926, 939 (1986) (holding that increased
deference is afforded to an agency's interpretation of its own regulations).
35. Guernsey, 115 S. Ct. at 1236. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395(x)(vXl)(A) (1988). Sec-
tion 1395(x)(v)(1)(A) provides:
The reasonable cost of any services shall be the cost actually incurred, exclud-
ing therefrom any part of the incurred cost found to be unnecessary in the
efficient delivery of needed health services, and shall be determined in accor-
dance with regulations establishing the method or methods to be used, and
the items to be included, in determining such costs for various types or class-
es of institutions, agencies and services; except that in any case to which
paragraph (2) or (3) applies, the amount of the payment determined under
such paragraph with respect to the services involved shall be considered the
reasonable cost of such services. In prescribing .the regulations referred to in
the preceding sentence, the Secretary shall consider, among other things, the
principles generally applied by national organizations or established prepayment
organizations (which have developed such principles) in computing the amount
of payment, to be made by persons other than the recipients of services, to
providers of services on account of services furnished to such recipients by
such providers. Such regulations may provide for determination of the costs of
services on a per diem, per unit, per capita, or other basis, may provide for
using different methods in different circumstances, 'may provide for the use of
estimates of costs of particular items or services, may provide for the estab-
lishment of limits on the direct or indirect overall incurred costs or incurred
costs of specific items or services or groups of items or services to be recog-
nized as reasonable based on estimates of the costs necessary in the efficient
delivery of needed health services to individuals covered by the insurance
programs established under this subchapter, and may provide for the use of
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noted that the Secretary is not required to follow GAAP but
rather, the statute merely instructs the Secretary to consider
adopting methods for reimbursing providers such as those
methods generally used by national organizations or established
prepayment organizations. 3' The majority further decided that
it is not necessary for the Secretary to address every possible
reimbursement question, either by default rules or by
specification, in the process of making fair reimbursement
determinations."
The majority also concluded that the Secretary may issue
guidelines which determine the amortization of defeasance
losses.38 The Court reasoned that section 233 of the Manual is
appropriate assurance that capital related costs allowable under
the regulations are reimbursed in a manner consistent with the
statute's mandate that the program bear no more or no less
than its fair share of costs.39 The Court found that the rule
issued in section 233 adequately exemplifies the statutory ban
on cross-subsidization. 4° This was illustrated by the Secretary's
application of section 233 to the facts of the instant case.1
The Supreme Court concluded that section 233 of the Manual
should be treated as an interpretive rule for APA purposes.42
charges or a percentage of charges where this method reasonably reflects the
costs. Such regulation shall (i) take into account both direct and indirect costs
of providers of services (excluding therefrom any such costs, including- standby
costs, which are determined in accordance with regulations to be unnecessary
in the efficient delivery of services covered by the insurance programs estab-
lished under this subchapter) in order that, under the methods of determining
costs, the necessary costs of efficiently delivering covered services to individu-
als covered by the insurance programs established by this subchapter will not
be borne by individuals not so covered, and the costs with respect to individu-
als not so covered will not be borne by such insurance programs, and (ii)
provide for the making of suitable retroactive corrective adjustments where, for
a provider of services for any fiscal period, the aggregate reimbursement pro-
duced by the methods of determining costs proves to be either inadequate or
excessive.
Id. (emphasis added).




40. Id. at 1238. See St. Mary of Nazareth Hosp. Ctr. v. Schweiker, 718 F.2d
459 (1983) (holding that section 233 is meant to prevent the Medicare program from
subsidizing non-Medicare related costs and equally clearly proscribes Medicare from
being subsidized by non-Medicare sources).
41. Guernsey, 115 S. Ct. at 1238. The Secretary reasoned that amortization
was required to avoid the statutory ban of 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(v)(1)(A) on cross-sub-
sidization because the loss was derived over a significant time period from patient
services. Id.
42. Id. at 1239.
Recent Decisions
The Court recognized that interpretive rules do not require
notice and comment and that as such, interpretive rules are not
legally binding.43 The majority believed that the rulemaking
required by the APA would be necessary if the interpretive rule
led to the adoption of a position incompatible with existing
regulations." The Supreme Court, in contrast to the Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, concluded that section 233 did not
create a substantial change in the regulations.4"
The United States Supreme Court decided by a five to four
vote that the Secretary is not bound to use GAAP in applying a
method to determine appropriate levels of reimbursement to
providers."' The Court stated that GAAP was not necessarily
economically realistic and that if the Court were to impose upon
the Secretary the duty to adopt GAAP, then the Secretary would
have to undergo a rigorous rulemaking process each time a
disagreement with GAAP arose on a reimbursement issue."7
The Court also concluded that GAAP is a varied collection of
conventions, rules and procedures that define the acceptable
accounting practices that presently exist.' The majority
concluded that there was no intention on the Secretary's part to
interpret various sources of GAAP in developing interpretive
rules on the timing of Medicare reimbursement. 9
The Court noted that the procedures followed in Guernsey are
illustrative of a workable framework for the highly complex
Medicare reimbursement process."0 The Court reasoned that
the Secretarys statutory duties had been fulfilled when
regulations had been promulgated setting forth the basic
methods of reimbursement and when interpretive rules had
been issued to advise providers on the application of the
Medicare statute relating to reimbursement claims.51 Because
the Secretary is not bound to make Medicare reimbursements in
accordance with GAAP, the Court stated that the requirements
of section 233 that bond defeasance losses be amortized did not
amount to a substantive change in the regulations. 2
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. (citing Guernsey v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 996 F.2d
830, 832 (1993), rev'd sub nom. Shalala v. Guernsey Memorial Hosp., 115 S. Ct.
1232 (1995)).









Section 233 was found to be a valid interpretive rule and thus,
the Secretary's reliance on the rule to deny Guernsey's claim for
full reimbursement of its defeasance loss in 1985 was considered
to be appropriate.53 In so doing, the United States Supreme
Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit and held that it was proper to amortize Guernsey's
defeasance loss over the remaining term of the old bond issue.54
Justice O'Connor, in a dissenting opinion, focused on the
timing of the reimbursement."5 Justice O'Connor acknowledged
that the Court must give deference to an agency's interpretation
of its own regulations.56 However, Justice O'Connor stated that
the Court could not sustain an agency's interpretation of its
regulations if the interpretation is erroneous or inconsistent
with the underlying purpose of the regulations promulgated by
the agency.57 Justice O'Connor believed that the intent of the
Medicare Statute Was such that the Secretary' would state the
applicable reimbursement mechanisms in the regulations. 8
According to Justice O'Connor, default rules covering a spectrum
of situations should be included in the regulations until such
time as specific regulations are promulgated regarding
particular types of costs." The dissent found that in 42 C.F.R.
§ 413.20, the Secretary adopted GAAP as a default rule for
reimbursement in situations such as that in Guernsey." As
support for her premise, Justice O'Connor noted the widespread
use of GAAP in other health care institutions.6' Justice
O'Connor also considered it to be significant that hospitals
reporting to Medicare follow GAAP in cost reporting
functions. 2 Justice O'Connor noted that there must be some
consistency between the functions of cost reporting and cost
reimbursement.63 Justice O'Connor found such a link in 42
C.F.R. § 413.20," which states that a provider hospital
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1237, 1240.
55. Id. at 1240 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). A dissenting opinion was filed by
Justice O'Connor who was joined by Justices Scalia, Souter and Thomas. Id.
56. Guernsey, 115 S. Ct. at 1240. See Lyng v. Payne, 476 U.S. 926, 939 (1986)
(holding that an agency's own interpretation of its regulations is entitled to substan-
tial deference).
57. Guernsey, 115 S. Ct. at 1240.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1241.
60. Id. at 1241-42.
61. Id. at 1241.
62. Guernsey, 115 S. Ct. at 1241.
63. Id. at 1242.
64. Id. 42 C.F.R. § 413.20(d) provides:
The principles of cost reimbursement require that providers maintain sufficient
Vol. 34:435
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generally need not modify its accounting and reporting practices
in order to determine what costs Medicare will cover. 5 In
conclusion, Justice O'Connor interpreted 42 C.F.R. § 413.20 to
require that in the absence of a regulation concerning the
specific reimbursement transaction requested by the provider,
Medicare providers must be reimbursed according to GAAP 6
The dissent also found no insurmountable problems inherent in
the APA which the Secretary could not meet in promulgating
regulations, because Congress believed the Secretary could meet
the challenge.67 Justice O'Connor believed that the situation
present in this case was foreseen by the Secretary and should
have been addressed directly by a regulation.
The dissent concluded that the Secretary's reimbursement
decision could not be rationalized as a valid application of the
existing regulations. In the dissent's view, Guernsey's basis
for reimbursement for its advance refunding costs was derived
from GAAP and the Secretary's published regulations.70 The
dissent noted that the Secretary's application of section 233,
which denied Guernsey's request, was a departure from
GAAP.7" The dissent noted that the reimbursement decision
was contrary to the agency's own regulations and therefore was
"not in accordance with law" within the meaning of the APA.72
financial records and statistical data for proper determination of costs payable
under the program. Standardized definitions, accounting, statistics, and report-
ing practices that are widely accepted in the hospital and related fields are
followed. Changes in these practices and systems will not be required in order
to determine costs payable under principles of reimbursement. Essentially the
methods of determining costs payable under Medicare involve making use of
data available from the institution's basis accounts, as usually maintained to
arrive at equitable and proper payment for services to beneficiaries.
42 C.F.Rl § 413.20(d) (1994).
65. Guernsey, 115 S. Ct. at 1242.
66. Id. at 1243.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1245.
70. Guernsey, 115 S. Ct. at 1245.
71. Id.
72. Id. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1994). Section 706 provides in pertinent part:
To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing court
shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory
provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an
agency action. The reviewing court shall-
(1) compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; and
(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found
to be-
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law;
(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity;
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The dissent agreed with the court of appeals that there is a
strong correlation between cost reporting and cost
reimbursement regulations and this correlation is too strong to
be made ineffective by a rule not adopted in accordance with the
rulemaking provisions of the APA.73  Justice O'Connor
concluded that the interpretive rule announced in section 233 of
the Manual should be declared invalid.74
Historically, Medicare was developed as a federal insurance
program that provides for the medical and hospitalization costs
of the elderly. 7 The Medicare statutes have been incorporated
into the Social Security sections of the United States Code.76 In
the statutes, the Secretary has been directed to make
regulations to implement the applicable statutes passed by
Congress concerning the Medicare program.77 One of the
requirements directs the Secretary to pay the lesser of
customary or reasonable cost of any services provided for
beneficiaries of the Medicare program.78 A reasonable cost is
defined as the actual incurred cost less any cost found to be
unnecessary in the efficient delivery of health services.79
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short
of statutory right;
(D) without observance of procedure required by law;
(E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to sections
556 and 557 of this title or otherwise reviewed on the record of an
agency hearing provided by statute; or
(F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to
trial de novo by the reviewing court.
In making the foregoing determinations, the court shall review the whole re-
cord or those parts of it cited by a party, and due account shall be taken of
the rule of prejudicial error.
Id.
73. Guernsey, 115 S. Ct. at 1245-46.
74. Id. at 1240.
75. See ANTHONY R. KOVNER ET AL., JONAS'S HEALTH CARE DELIVERY IN THE
UNITED STATES 327 (5th ed. 1995). In 1993 Medicare had 36,300,000 enrollees and
expenses of $150,370,000,000 for benefits paid to providers of services. U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS 243 (1994).
76. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (1988).
77. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395b-l(a)(1)(B), 1395b-2 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
78. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395f(b)l (1988). Section 1395f(b)l states in pertinent part:
The amount paid to any provider of services . . . with respect to services for
which paymeht may be made under this part shall be . . . the lesser of (A)
the reasonable cost of such services as determined by section 1395x(v) of this
title and as further limited by section 1395oo(b)2 of this title, or (B) the cus-
tomary charges with respect to such services.
Id.
79. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(v)(1)(A) (1988). Section 1395x(v)(1)(A) provides in
pertinent part:
[T]he Secretary shall consider, among other things, the principles generally
applied by national organizations or established pre-payment organizations
Recent Decisions
From the initiation of the Medicare program until 1983,
hospitals were paid based on the actual costs incurred in
providing services."0 In 1983, Congress enacted legislation
which created the Prospective Payment System (the
"System").8 Under the System, hospitals are paid a fixed
amount based on the diagnosis of the hospitalized patient.82
Because of this change, hospitals are no longer reimbursed on
the actual costs incurred in providing services." However,
extraordinary items such as the defeasance loss at issue in
Guernsey are still compensable to the extent that they do not
violate the cross-subsidization provision of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395x(v).'
The process of receiving information from the providers of
health care services under the Medicare program and the
payment for these services by the federal government is known
as the reimbursement process." The regulations developed by
the Secretary to accomplish this task are contained in 42 C.F.R.
§ 413.'6 The two sections at issue in Guernsey are the sections
pertaining to the cost data that must be forwarded to the
Secretary and the system of accounting that must be used by the
Secretary in computing the amounts due the provider." These
sections were interpreted by the agency in the form of
interpretive rulings which are contained in the Manual."
(which have developed such principles) in computing the amount of payment,
to be made by persons other than the recipients of services, to providers of
services on account of services furnished to such recipients by such providers.
Id.
80. Douglas E. Cressler, Medicare Provider Reimbursement Disputes: Mapping
the Contorted Borders of Administrative and Judicial Review, 26 SOC. SECURITY REP.
SER. (West) 741, 742 (1989).
81. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (establishing
payment to hospital providers under the System). See also KOVNER ET AL., supra
note 75, at 142 (discussing the impact of the System on Medicare reimbursement to
hospitals).
. 82. Cressler, supra note 80, at 742. The payments to health care providers are
based upon diagnosis related groupings ("DRG's"). Id.
83. Id.
84. See supra note 35 for a description of the costs reimbursable under the
System.
85. The Medicare program itself is under the guidance of the Health Care
Financing Administration (the "HCFA"). KOVNER ET AL., supra note 75, at 327. The
HCFA contracts with intermediary organizations in each region of the United States
to provide for claims processing and payment of claims that are due providers under
the Medicare program. Id. Providers submit claims directly to the intermediaries and
are paid based on the information that they provide. Id.
86. See 42 C.F.R. § 413 (1994).
87. Guernsey, 115 S. Ct. at 1234.
88. See supra note 10 for a discussion of applicable statutes relating to the
Secretary's authority to issue interpretive rulings.
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The United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of
reimbursement within the Medicare statutes in Bethesda
Hospital Association v. Bowen.9 In Bethesda, a group of
hospitals challenged a determination by the PRRB that it lacked
jurisdiction to decide the merits of the group's claim concerning
reimbursement for malpractice premium costs paid by providers
in the group.9" The providers, in cost reports submitted to the
fiscal intermediary for 1980, followed a 1979 regulation of the
Secretary that disallowed portions of the costs by Medicare
providers." The group then filed for a hearing before the PRRB
to challenge the validity of the 1979 regulation." The PRRB
held that the hearing did not fall within its statutory
jurisdiction." The PRRB held that its authority to grant
hearings is limited to situations in which a provider is
dissatisfied with a final determination of the fiscal
intermediary.94 The PRRB reasoned that the providers in the
group could not be dissatisfied because they had submitted a
cost report according to Medicare guidelines, thus effecting a
self-disallowance of the claims. 5
The district court disagreed and held that the PRRB should
have exercised jurisdiction over the matter.96 The Secretary
appealed the district court's ruling to the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals, which reversed the district court. 7 The court of
appeals based its determination upon previous decisions in this
area.98 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to
resolve the conflict among the circuit courts on the matter and
ultimately reversed, in part, the decision of the court of
appeals.99
Justice Kennedy, writing for a unanimous Court, looked to the
"4plain meaning" of the statute granting jurisdiction to the PRRB
and determined that the PRRB had jurisdiction to resolve the
89. 485 U.S. 399 (1988).
90. Bethesda, 485 U.S. at 401.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 402.
94. Id.
95. Bethesda, 485 U.S. at 402.
96. Bethesda Hosp. v. Heckler, 609 F. Supp. 1360, 1368 (S.D. Ohio 1985),
rev'd in part sub non . Bethesda Hosp. v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs.,
810 F.2d 558 (6th Cir. 1987), rev'd in part sub non. Bethesda Hosp. Ass'n v. Bowen,
485 U.S. 399 (1988).
97. Bethesda Hosp. v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs., 810 F.2d 558,
559-60 (6th Cir. 1987), rev'd in part sub nom. Bethesda Hosp. Ass'n v. Bowen, 485
U.S. 399 (1988).
98. Bethesda, 810 F.2d at 561.
99. Bethesda, 485 U.S. at 402.
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issues presented by the providers in the group."°  The
Secretary contended that the providers in the group could not
have been dissatisfied with the information contained in the cost
report which disallowed the amount. 1 ' The Secretary argued
that because the providers in the group did not ask for the
amounts in the cost report as submitted to the intermediary, the
providers in the group could not argue with the amount that the
intermediary reimbursed."2 The Supreme Court rejected this
argument, holding that supplying a cost report in full
compliance with the dictates of the Secretary did not bar the
providers in the group from challenging the amount of
reimbursement." 3 Finding different roles for the intermediary
and the PRRB, the Court held that even though the PRRB could
not rule on its own that the Secretary's regulation was invalid,
the PRRB could certainly impact the judicial review.'"
In Bowen v. Georgetown University Hospital,1"5 the United
States Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of
Appeals of the District of Columbia and held that the Secretary
had no statutory authority to engage in retroactive
rulemaking.0 6  In Georgetown, the Secretary developed a
schedule for calculating cost limits.0 7  Various hospitals
brought suit in the District Court of the District of Columbia
and the district court invalidated the Secretary's rule.' The
district court's decision was not appealed by the Secretary, but
subsequently the Secretary published a notice seeking public
comment to reissue the original cost limit rule.0 9
In the same year that the Secretary published the reissue
notice, Congress amended the Medicare Act, providing for a
Prospective Payment System, thus rendering any prospective
application of the rule proposed by the Secretary moot except for
100. Id. at 403. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(a). Section 1395oo(a) provides in perti-
nent part: "[A] provider . . . may obtain a hearing before the board with respect to
[its] cost report if . . . (1) such provider is (A)(1) dissatisfied with a final determina-
tion of. . . its fiscal intermediary . . . as to the amount of total program reimburse-
ment due the provider . . . for the period covered by such report." Id. See INS v.
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 431 (1987); Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resourc-
es Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984) (cases holding that a reviewing
court should look to the plain meaning of a statute under review).
101. Bethesda, 485 U.S. at 402.
102. Id. at 404.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 406-07.
105. 488 U.S. 204 (1988).
106. Georgetown, 488 U.S. at 215-16.
107. Id. at 206.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 207.
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a fifteen month period prior to the new amendment to
Medicare.11 The Secretary, after considering the comments
received, reissued the original rule and subsequently attempted
to. recoup the monies paid to the hospitals in excess of the cost
limit as though the original rule had never been invalidated."'
The hospitals which benefitted by the invalidation of the original
rule by the district court exhausted their administrative appeals
and sought judicial relief, claiming that the retroactive cost
schedule was invalid under Medicare and the APA."' The
District Court of the District of Columbia granted summary
judgment for the hospitals and the decision was appealed by the
Secretary to the court of appeals, which affirmed the district
court." 3 The court of appeal's decision was appealed to the
United States Supreme Court, which granted certiorari and
affirmed. 4
Acknowledging that retroactivity is not favored in the law, the
Court stated that congressional enactments and administrative
rules should not be given retroactive effect unless the language
required that result."1 The majority also stated that even in
such a situation, courts should be reluctant to find such
authority absent a specific statutory grant."' The Secretary
contended that various sections of the Medicare Act provide for
the authority to make retroactive adjustments such as the one
proposed." 7 The Court held that there is no specific statutory
authority for the Secretary to engage in indirect retroactive
rulemaking and affirmed the court of appeals."8
In Good Samaritan Hospital v. Shalala,"9 several rural
hospitals brought an action against the Secretary and sought
reclassification as urban hospitals and retroactive
reimbursement amounts appropriate to that reclassification. 20
110. Id.
111. Georgetown, 488 U.S. at 207.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 207-08.
114. Id. at 208.
115. Id.
116. Georgetown, 488 U.S. at 208.
117. Id. at 209.
118. Id. at 215-16.
119. 113 S. Ct. 2151 (1993).
120. Good Samaritan, 113 S. Ct. at 2156. Under the Medicare reimbursement
structure, hospitals are paid different amounts based upon whether they are in rural
or urban areas. Id. This difference is based upon whether the facility is located
within a Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area ("SMSA"). Id. at 2155. "A SMSA is
a large population center and neighboring communities that are highly integrated
economically and socially with that center." PAUL J. FELDSTEIN, HEALTH CARE ECO-
NOMICS 50 (3d ed. 1988). For Medicare purposes, rural areas are areas outside of a
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The hospitals filed an appeal with the PRRB challenging the
cost limits imposed'on the hospitals.'2 ' The PRRB held that it
lacked the authority to grant the relief requested and granted
the hospital's request for expedited judicial relief.22 The
District Court for the District of Nebraska held for the hospitals
and reasoned that the statute requires the payment of all costs
shown to be reasonable regardless of whether the hospitals
surpassed the amount calculated under the cost limit schedule
developed by the Secretary.'23 The Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit reversed the district court,'24 basing its decision
on the Supreme Court's decision in Georgetown, which prohibits
retroactive rulemaking by administrative agencies.' The
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a
conflict among the circuits on this question.2 '
The Court began its analysis with the rule announced in
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council"
regarding the interpretation of statutes. The Court then
determined that the clause at issue was ambiguous and capable
of being interpreted to the benefit of either party.128 In this
type of situation, the Court emphasized that the rule announced
in National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Boston & Maine
Corp. 2 9 applied. The National Railroad Court held that when
a statute is capable of two different interpretations, the Court
will rely upon the interpretation that is espoused by the agency
entrusted with the interpretation of the statute. 3 ' The Court
held that there was an adequate basis for the regulations
developed by the Secretary that mandates the cost limits
imposed on the hospital providers and reversed the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeal's decision.'
SMSA which do not have within the region of greater than 50,000 population or an
area with a total metropolitan population of less 100,000. KOVNER ET AL., supra note
75, at 170.
121. Good Samaritan, 113 S. Ct. at 2156.
122. Id. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(f)(1) (1995) (allowing expedited judicial relief in
the Medicare appeals process).
123. Good Samaritan, 113 S. Ct. at 2156.
124. Good Samaritan Hosp. v. Sullivan, 952 F.2d 1017 (8th Cir. 1991), rev'd
sub nom. Good Samaritan Hosp. v. Shalala, 113 S. Ct. 2151 (1993).
125. Good Samaritan, 113 S. Ct. at 2156.
126. Id. at 2157.
127. 467 U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984) (holding that if the intent of Congress in cre-
ating a statute is clear, the matter of statutory interpretation for the courts is end-
ed).
128. Good Samaritan, 113 S. Ct. at 2157-58.
129. 503 U.S. 407 (1992).
130. Good Samaritan, 113 S. Ct at 2159.
131. Id. at 2160. The Court also found unpersuasive the hospitals' argument
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In Thomas Jefferson University v. Shalala,'32  the Court
announced that a court reviewing a decision of the Secretary
must defer to the Secretary's interpretation of a regulation
unless an alternative reading is compelled by the regulation's
plain language or by other indications of the Secretary's intent
at the time of the regulation's promulgation.'33
In Thomas Jefferson, a teaching hospital challenged the
decision of a fiscal intermediary to deny certain teaching costs
associated with the hospital's mission." The PRRB reversed
the intermediary's decision, thus allowing reimbursement for the
hospital.3 5 The decision was then overturned by the Secretary,
who reinstated the fiscal intermediary's original decision." 6
The hospital filed for review in the District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, where the Secretary's decision
was upheld on summary judgment.'37 The Third Circuit Court
of Appeals affirmed the district court. 3 ' The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed the decision in
favor of the Secretary.' The Court found that the Secretary's
decision followed the intent of Congress that Medicare funds
should not be used to subsidize educational activities as opposed
to patient care activities and that the Secretary's interpretation
was reasonable and deserved deference.'4
In Mother Francis Hospital v. Shalala,"' the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals addressed the issue of whether a defeasance
loss should be reimbursed in the year it was incurred. 142 In
Mother Francis, a hospital retired bonded debt through issuance
concerning the shifting views of the administrative agency charged with implementa-
tion. Id. The Court stated that there had been a change in the manner in which the
agency desired matters such as the one involved in the case to be handled over the
previous ten years. Id. The Court stated: "[A]n administrative agency is not disquali-
fied from changing its mind; and when it does, the courts still sit in review of the
administrative decision and should not approach the statutory construction issue de
novo and without regard to the administrative understanding of the statutes." Id. at
2161.
132. 114 S. Ct. 2381 (1994).




137. Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Sullivan, No. Civ.A.90-2036, 1992 WL 99618, at
*1 (E.D. Pa. 1992), affd sub nom. Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 993 F.2d. 879
(3d Cir. 1993), affd, 114 S. Ct. 2381 (1994).
138. Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 993 F.2d. 879 (3d Cir. 1993), affd, 114
S. Ct. 2381 (1994).
139. Thomas Jefferson, 114 S. Ct. at 2383.
140. Id. at 2384.
141. 15 F.3d 423 (5th Cir. 1994).
142. Mother Francis, 15 F.3d at 424.
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of new bonds and incurred a defeasance loss.4 ' The hospital's
request for reimbursement was denied by a fiscal
intermediary.1" The PRRB reversed the intermediary, holding
that in the absence of specific regulations, GAAP controls the
reimbursement process." The Secretary reversed the PRRB,
holding that section 233 of the Manual controlled the issue."
The Secretary's decision was appealed by the hospital to a
magistrate judge of the District Court for the Eastern District of
Texas, who issued a report and recommendation in favor of the
hospital.'47 The magistrate found that section 233 was a
manual provision without the force and effect of law and was
thus ineffective to change the meaning of the governing
regulations calling for GAAP. The recommendation was
rejected by the district court, which found that section 233 is an
interpretive rule of the regulations and is therefore a valid
rule. 49 The district court granted sdmmary judgment for the
Secretary and the hospital appealed."5
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit began its analysis
by reviewing the applicable statutes for reimbursement of
reasonable costs incurred by providers in providing services to
Medicare beneficiaries.' 5' The court noted that every other
court, except the district court in this case, had rejected the
Secretary's contention that the regulations only call for GAAP in
the reporting function of a provider's report and that the
regulations do not call for GAAP in the reimbursement
process.'52 The Fifth Circuit noted the Sixth Circuit's decision
in Guernsey when it echoed Guernsey's holding by stating that
the connection between cost reporting and cost reimbursement is
too strong to be broken by a rule not adopted in accordance with
the notice and comment provisions of the APA. '5 The Court
also distinguished the case of Sun Towers, Inc. v Heckler
from Guernsey because in Guernsey, there was no question about
whether the incurred cost was allowable within the Medicare
143. Id.
144. Id. at 425.
145. Id.
146. Id.




151. Id. at 426.
152. Mother Francis, 15 F.3d at 426.
153. Id. at 427.
154. 725 F.2d 315 (5th Cir.) (holding that GAAP is not necessarily to be used
in determining if a particular cost is allowable), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 823 (1984).
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Statute."' Adopting Guernsey, the Fifth Circuit held for the
hospital provider and reversed the decision of the district
court.
1 5 6
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Guernsey
affirmed the earlier holdings of the Supreme Court with respect
to the deference to be given to rulings of administrative
agencies. The dispute in Guernsey centered on whether the
regulations require GAAP to be used in all aspects of the
financial reimbursement process of Medicare.'57 While the
Court and the Secretary agreed that the applicable provisions of
the regulations only pertain to the cost reporting function, it left
providers speculating as to what methods should be applied in
computing the amount of reimbursement for items related to
interest expense and capital losses.5 ' This type of uncertainty
leads to apprehension when one considers the significant role
that Medicare plays in a healthcare provider's revenue
stream. It is a reasonable conclusion that this type of
uncertainty with regard to a major source of revenue would lead
providers to cache funds until the uncertainty is resolved. The
cached funds could be better utilized to provide needed
healthcare services to the eligible population.
One commentator has found the Guernsey decision as an
implication that the current regulations pertaining to Medicare
are perceived to be sufficient to the Court, and if gaps exist
within the regulations the Secretary need not promulgate any
additional regulations because the gaps in the regulations are
being filled with interpretive manuals or administrative appeal
rulings. 6' Professor Barry opines that providers can look
forward to Guernsey being "quoted again and again" in future
litigation challenging actions taken pursuant to the HCFA's
interpretive manuals.'' Professor Barry further believes that
providers will have no idea what rules will apply by default
when there is no apposite Medicare regulation.'
The Court also viewed as too cumbersome the process
described in the APA interpretive rulings as it related to the
complex world of health care reimbursement. Even though the
155. Mother Francis, 15 F.3d at 427.
156. Id.
157. Guernsey, 115 S. Ct. at 1234.
158. See Barry, supra note 2, at 6.
159. In 1993, Medicare accounted for over 56% of the revenues received by
hospitals in the United States. See KOVNER ET AL., supra note 75, at 328.
160. See Barry, supra note 2, at 5.
161. Id. See KOVNER ET AL., supra note 75, at 327.
162. Barry, supra note 2, at 5.
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Department of Health and Human Services technically won in
Guernsey, on June 27, 1995, the Secretary issued a final rule
clarifying the accrual basis of accounting with regard to
Medicare reimbursement of various other provider costs."
Under the new rule, expenses must be incurred by a health care
provider before Medicare will pay its share of the expenses.'
In giving regulatory support to what the HCFA viewed as its
longstanding policy; the HCFA hoped to decrease the
opportunity of a successful challenge to its policy."s The new
rule also creates a new subsection for the accrual provisions.""
The stated reasons for this are to eliminate confusion among
providers and give recognition to the distinction between GAAP
in cost reporting by providers and the determination of allowable
costs under the Medicare statute.167 This is a much needed
positive step in reducing provider reimbursement concerns.
One may conclude that Guernsey may be inconsequential in
United States Supreme Court jurisprudence, but the Guernsey
decision did motivate one administrative agency into formalizing
its interpretive rules into regulations in order to reduce the
confusion of health care providers in the Medicare
reimbursement process.
Eugene A. Vittone H
163. See 60 Fed. Reg. 33,126 (1995) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 413).
164. See HCFA Issues Final Rule Clarifying Accrual Accounting for Reim-
bursement, Health Care Daily (BNA) (June 28, 1995) [hereinafter HCFA].
165. HCFA, supra note 164.
166. Id.
167. Id.
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